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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - CONCLUSIVENESS OF DECISION UNDER
FINALITY CLAUSE OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACT.-Plaintiff contracted
to construct a dam for the United States Government. The contract
contained a "finality clause" ' which provided that all disputes of fact
arising out of the contract should be decided by the government con-
tracting officer, subject to an appeal to the head of the administrative
department 2 whose decision was to be conclusive upon both parties.3
The contracting officer required the plaintiff to perform certain ser-
vices which, the plaintiff alleged, were not within the purview of the
contract. The plaintiff performed the services but appealed the order
of the contracting officer denying his claim, to the department head. 4
Following an adverse finding by that official, the plaintiff sued in the
Court of Claims 5 for extra compensation. The Court of Claims en-
tertained jurisdiction, deciding that the dispute was one of law rather
than one of fact and that therefore the "finality clause" did not pre-
clude judicial review of the contracting officer's action. The Court
of Claims set aside the order of the contracting officer as arbitrary
and capricious." The Government appealed, the parties stipulating
that the dispute was one of fact. Held, reversed. In the absence of
a showing of fraud, the decision of the contracting officer is not sub-
ject to review by the Court of Claims. United States v. Wunderlich,
72 Sup. Ct. 154 (1951).
1 "Article 15. Disputes.-Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
contract, all disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract
shall be decided by the contracting officer subject to written appeal by the
contractor within 30 days to the head of the department concerned or his duly
authorized representative, whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon
both parties thereto. In the meantime the contractor shall diligently proceed
with the work as directed." Standard United States Contract Form 23:
United States v. Wunderlich, 72 Sup. Ct. 154, 155 n. 1 (1951).
2 Unless the contractor exhausts his administrative remedies according to
the agreed procedure by appeal to the appropriate head of the department,
the courts will under no circumstances allow review of an adverse decision.
Silas Mason Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 432 (Ct. Cl. 1945) ; W. Horace
Williams Co. v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 431 (1937); Fitzgibbon v. United
States, 52 Ct. Ci. 164 (1917).
s Although the "finality clause" is inserted primarily for the protection of
the government, the courts have frequently sustained it in favor of the con-
tractor. Steacy-Schmidt Mfg. Co. v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 499 (1928);
Yale & Town Mfg. Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 633 (1923).
4 In the instant case the head of the department was the Secretary of the
Interior.
S28 U. S. C. § 1491(4) (1946). The Court of Claims Act gives the Court
of Claims jurisdiction to render judgments on all claims against the United
States arising out of contract, express or implied.6 Wunderlich v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 92 (1950).
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Until recently, the Supreme Court had held that the decision of
the contracting officer under a "finality clause" was conclusive, and
not subject to review in the absence of fraud, gross error implying
bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment.7 Following
this settled rule the Court reversed a decision of the Court of Claims
on the sole ground that the latter permitted review on the basis of
gross error, rather than upon gross error as would imply bad faith.3
Although it has been stated that the contracting officer has a duty to
act reasonably 9 and impartially,' ° the Supreme Court has otherwise
strictly adhered to the rule requiring an affirmative showing of fraud,
actual or implied. Mere incompetence and negligence 11 or mistake 12
on the part of the contracting officer is insufficient to afford a basis
for review.
The Court of Claims, however, has adhered to no such rigid rule.
This Court, by virtue of a liberal interpretation of the criterion laid
down by the Supreme Court, has allowed review where a contracting
officer's decision is arbitrary and capricious,' 3 unreasonable, 4 or lack-
ing in substantial evidence. 15 Review is granted where the facts were
not fairly 16 or impartially 17 considered or where the decision was
rendered without adequate information.' s
In addition, the Court of Claims has reserved to itself the right
to review where the dispute is one of law rather than of fact.19 This
Court has repeatedly held that the interpretation of a contract is a
question of law,20 and refuses to be ousted of jurisdiction where such
7 United States v. Gleason, 175 U. S. 588 (1900); Sweeney v. United
States, 109 U. S. 618 (1883) ; Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398 (1878).8 Martinsburg & Potomac R. R. v. March, 114 U. S. 549 (1885).
9 Saalfield v. United States, 246 U. S. 610 (1918); see Ripley v. United
States, 223 U. S. 695, 701-702 (1911).
10 United States v. Penner Installation Corp., 340 U. S. 898 (1950), rehear-
ing denied, 340 U. S. 923 (1951). It is significant to note that the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Claims in a per curiam opinion
by an evenly divided court, the Chief Justice abstaining.
21 Chicago S. F. & C. R. R. R. v. Price, 138 U. S. 185 (1891).
12 Cf. Martinsburg & Potomac R. R. v. March, 114 U. S. 549 (1884).
'3 Newhall-Herkner Construction Co. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 321
(Ct. C1. 1950) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp.
963 (Ct. Cl. 1950) ; Scully v. United States, 197 Fed. 327 (D. Nev. 1912).
14 Stafford v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 155 (Ct. Cl. 1947); see Rego
Building Corp. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 445, 490 (1943).
15 Loftis v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 816 (Ct. Cl. 1948) ; Ruff v. United
States, 96 Ct. Cl. 148 (1942).
16 Zweig v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 472 (1941) ; Penker Construction Co.
v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 1 (1942).
i1 Cf. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 963
(Ct. Cl. 1950).
's Shippey & Outzen v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 151 (1913).
19 Pfotzer v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 390 (Ct. Cl. 1948); McShain v.
United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 334 (1936); Schmoll v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 1
(1940); Davis v. United States, 82 Ct. Cl. 334 (1936); Albina Marine Iron
Works v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 714 (1934); Lyons v. United States, 30
Ct. Cl. 352 (1899).
20 Callahan Construction Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 538 (1940).
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a question is involved.21 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has
declined to make this distinction between law and fact,2 2 and has re-
peatedly held that where contract interpretation was in dispute the
decision of the contracting officer was final in the absence of fraud, 28
notwithstanding a long line of lower court decisions holding that the
parties could not contract to submit questions of pure law to the final
decision of an arbiter.24  The inference is therefore compelling that
it is the policy of the Supreme Court, at least in cases involving gov-
ernment contracts, to treat interpretation as a factual question.25
The existing confusion in the decisions of the Court of Claims
involving government contract interpretation illustrates the need for
a clear pronouncement on the legal effect of a contracting officer's
order made pursuant to a "finality clause." The instant case supplies
a concise though somewhat harsh rule. The decision makes fraud
the only basis for review. In the words of the Supreme Court, "By
fraud we mean conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be
dishonest." 26  Findings that the administrative decision was arbi-
trary, capricious, or grossly erroneous are not equatable to findings
of fraud and will not fit within this rigid rule.
It must be remembered, however, that this rule applies only to
a special class of administrative action-a class wherein the parties
to a contract have agreed that the administrative decision shall be
final. The general rule applicable to administrative decisions is other-
wise and, in the main, review will be granted where the action of the
administrative agency was arbitrary and capricious or lacking in sub-
stantial evidence,2 7 even though such action was specifically declared
conclusive by statute.28 Notwithstanding its apparent injustice,29 the
rule enunciated in the principal case will introduce consistency and
will eliminate the confusion which has heretofore existed.
21 Stafford v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 155 (Ct. Cl. 1947).22 United States v. Beuttas, 324 U. S. 768 (1945).2 3 United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457 (1950).
24 Rae v. Luzerne County, 58 F. 2d 829 (M. D. Pa. 1932) ; Tatsuuma Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F. 2d 670 (9th Cir. 1925); Mitchell v.
Dougherty, 90 Fed. 639 (3d Cir. 1898).
25 Wunderlich v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 92, 212 (1950).
26 United States v. Wunderlich, 72 Sup. Ct. 154, 155 (1951).
27 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922).28 Reynolds v. United States, 292 U. S. 443 (1934); see United States v.
Williams, 278 U. S. 255, 257 (1929); Silberschein v. United States, 266 U. S.
221, 225 (1924).
29 At least two bills are pending in the House of Representatives, one of
them introduced by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee "to correct the
unfortunate holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Wunderlich case. . . .This is the case which virtually deifies the decision of
the contracting officer under a government contract in the absence of downright
cheating or dishonesty. The bills would allow judicial review to the same
extent as the McCARRAN-SUMNERS AcT where administrative decisions are not
supported by substantial evidence." NEW YORK STATE BAR AssOcIATIoN,
LAWYER SEnvicE LETrFR, No. 162, Feb. 20, 1952.
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BANKRUPTCY - ELECTION OF TRUSTEE - APPLICATION OF§ 44(A) BANKRUPTCY AcT.-At the first meeting of creditors, held
before a referee in bankruptcy, seven creditors, whose proofs of claim
totaled $7,000, nominated one Levy as their candidate for trustee.
An eighth claimant, the New York Meat Packing Co., with a proof
of claim in the sum of $93,000, nominated one Mills, as its candidate.
The right of the Meat Packing Co. to vote its claim was challenged
on the ground that it was owned and controlled by the same persons
who owned and controlled the bankrupt corporation. These objec-
tions were overruled by the referee and, as a consequence, neither
candidate received the necessary majority in both number and amount
of claims voted.' On failure of choice by the creditors, the referee
appointed Mills, the Meat Packing Company's nominee, as trustee.
Schwartz, one of the objecting creditors, petitioned for a review of
the referee's order. Held (one Judge dissenting), order affirmed.
The provision of the Bankruptcy Act, which disqualifies the bank-
rupt's ". . . stockholders or members, its officers, and the members
of its board of directors . . ." from voting to appoint a trustee in
bankruptcy,2 does not prohibit the present creditor corporation's
participation in the election. Schwartz v. Mills, 192 F. 2d 727 (2dCir. 1951). 8
Impartiality has always been a prime requisite for a trustee in
bankruptcy, entangling alliances between the trustee and the bank-
rupt entailing suspicious regard.4 The appointment of a bankrupt's
relative,5 close business associate,0 or attorney 7 usually fails the test,
and merits the stamp of invalidity.8
Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,9 allowing creditors the
'BANKRUPTCY Acr §56(a), 52 STAT. 865 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 92(a)
(1946). "Creditors shall pass upon matters submitted to them at their meet-
ings by a majority vote in number and amount of claims of all creditors ......
2 BANKRUPTCY AcT §44(a), 30 STAT. 557 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C.
§ 72(a) (1946).8 A second point of contention in the reported case: validity of the proof
of claim, is not here considered.
4 See Note, Disqualification of Trustee in Bankruptcy for Prejudicial
Associations, 43 YALE L. J. 1187 (1934).
5 In re Powell, 19 Fed. Cas. 1210, No. 11,354 (D. N. 3. 1868).
Wilson v. Continental Building & Loan Ass'n, 232 Fed. 824 (9th Cir.
1916).7 In re Wink, 206 Fed. 348 (D. Md. 1913).
8 But cf. In re Gloria Vanderbilt-Sonia Gowns, 26 F. Supp. 766 (S. D.
N. Y. 1938); In tre Syracuse Paper & Pulp Co., 164 Fed. 275 (N. D. N. Y.
1908).
9 B.Axaumicp ACT § 44(a), 30 STAT. 557 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C.
§ 72(a) (1946). "The creditors of a bankrupt, exclusive of the bankrupt's
relatives or, where the bankrupt is a corporation, exclusive of its stockholders
or members, its officers, and the members of its board of directors or trustees
or of other similar controlling bodies, shall, at the first meeting of creditors
after the adjudication . . . appoint a trustee or three trustees of such estate.
If the creditors do not appoint a trustee . . . the court shall make the ap-
pointment." See also Sections 55 and 56 of the BANimu, cY AcT, 11 U. S. C.
1952 ]
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right to elect the trustee, gave the Courts of Bankruptcy (judge or
referee) the right to preside at the first meeting of creditors and to
supervise trustee elections to properly insure against prejudiced
appointees.' 0 Generally, in the absence of conflict between his in-
terests and those of the general creditors, the creditors' nominee qual-
ifies for appointment." One method of assuring freedom from such
conflict has demonstrated itself in the practice of nullifying bankrupt-
controlled elections. Thus, active intervention in the election by the
bankrupt or his attorney, if adverse to the interests of the estate,
will void the appointment. 12 Similarly, votes cast at the solicitation
of the bankrupt or his attorney have been refused effect. 13 Never-
theless, prior to the 1938 amendments to the Act, relatives 14 of an
individual bankrupt, and stockholders, directors and officers of a cor-
porate bankrupt,'0 were permitted to cast their ballot where there
was no evidence of prejudice to the general creditors. Congress,
however, having determined that such persons bear ". . . too close
a connection with the bankrupt to make it proper that their vote
should be counted in the selection of the trustee .... ,, 16 foreclosed
their future participation by amending Section 44 of the Bankruptcy
Act.17
§§91, 92 (1946), for meetings of creditors and voters thereat. See also
BANKRUPTCY ACT § 1(9), 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 1(9)
(1946), which defines "Court" as ". . . the judge or the referee of the court
of bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending. ..."
10 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 8-22 and 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1633
(14th ed. 1940) for legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act and of Section
44(a). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 gave creditors the unrestricted right to
appoint the trustee. 30 STAT. 544 (1898). But the Supreme Court made the
appointment subject to approval of the courts. GENERAL ORDER IN BANKRUPTCY
No. 13. This is now ordered by Section 2(a) (17) of the Bankruptcy Act.
11 U. S. C. § 11(a)(17) (1946).
11 Mayflower Hat Co., 65 F. 2d 330, 331 (2d Cir. 1933) ; It re Allied
Owners' Corp., 4 F. Supp. 684, 688 (E. D. N. Y. 1933).
12 In re Bloomberg, 48 F. 2d 635 (D. Minn. 1931) ; see It re Rothleder,
232 Fed. 398 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). But cf. Sloan's Furriers v. Bradley, 146
F. 2d 757 (6th Cir. 1945) ; In re Ketterer Mfg. Co., 155 Fed. 398 (M. D. Pa.
1907).
13 In re McGill, 106 Fed. 57 (6th Cir. 1901) ; it re Stowe, 235 Fed. 463
(N. D. Cal. 1916); In re Sitting, 182 Fed. 917 (N. D. N. Y. 1910). But
of. In re Portage Wholesale Co., 183 F. 2d 959 (7th Cir. 1950) ; In re Parsons
Mfg. Co., 247 Fed. 126 (D. Mass. 1917) ; In re Rothleder, 232 Fed. 398 (S. D.
N. Y. 1916).
14 In re Rothleder, 232 Fed. 398 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). But cf. it re Ballan-
tine, 232 Fed. 271 (N. D. N. Y. 1916) ; In re Bogert, 3 Fed. Cas. 802, No. 1,598(S. D. N. Y. 1869).
15 In re L. W. Day & Co., 178 Fed. 545 (2d Cir. 1910); In re Gloria Van-
derbilt-Sonia Gowns, 26 F. Supp. 766 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); In re Stradley &
Co., 187 Fed. 285 (N. D. Ala. 1911); In re Syracuse Paper & Pulp Co., 164
Fed. 275 (N. D. N. Y. 1908).
16 Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1936), cited in
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1638 (14th ed. 1940).
1730 STAT. 557 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §72(a) (1946). "The
creditors of a bankrupt, exclusive of the bankrupt's relatives or, where the
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Since its enactment, the statute has been strictly construed. The
statutory disqualification is declared to be personal. Thus an assignee
of a bankrupt corporation's controlling stockholder was not deemed
to fall within its proscription.' 8 Nor was a creditor who had for-
merly owned stock in the bankrupt corporation but who had validly
assigned his holdings.' 9 The bankrupt's attorney has been held not
to be within the section's prohibition.20  Significantly, a relative of
a corporate-bankrupt's officer was not denied his vote.21
Nevertheless, the legislative prohibitions are not exclusive, and
one disqualified from participation prior to the amendment is not now
enfranchised by failure of specific exclusion. However, it is clear
that the contention advanced by the petitioner in the principal case
finds no authoritative support in the decisions prior to the passage of
Section 44(a) .22 Therefore, if a creditor corporation, whose owner-
ship and control mirror the bankrupt's, is to be denied its vote, the
authority for the denial must be gleaned from the present statute
itself.
Judge Frank, dissenting in the principal case, would accomplish
this result by disregarding the corporate entity 23 thereby invoking
the mandate of Section 44(a). The same judge, in his opinion in
the case of In re Loewer's Gambrims Brewery Co., 24 had already
stated that the claim of any such creditor corporation is to be sub-
ordinated to the claims of the independent creditors. Thus, his opin-
ion in the Schwartz case is to some extent a retreat from the former
position, which would not only disqualify the vote of a controlled
creditor, but would prefer other creditors' claims to his. It is sub-
mitted that the corporate entity has not been so lightly regarded in
the past.2 5
bankrupt is a corporation, exclusive of its stockholders or members, its officers,
and the members of its board of directors or trustees or of other similar con-
trolling bodies, shall .. . appoint a trustee or three trustees of such estate."
(Italics indicate material added by 1938 amendments, effective Sept. 22, 1938.)
18 See In re Latham Lithographic Corp., 107 F. 2d 749 (2d Cir. 1939).
19 In re Page Displays, 35 F. Supp. 140 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
20 See West Hills Park v. Doneca, 131 F. 2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1942).
Judge Frank, dissenting in the principal case, distinguishes the West Park de-
cision on the ground that the attorney was no longer alive. Schwartz v. Mills,
192 F. 2d 727, 735 (2d Cir. 1951).
21 In re Universal Seal Cap Co., 40 F. Supp. 420 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
22 See note 15 supra. It should be noted that the Gloria Vanderbilt case was
decided on November 14, 1938, nearly two months after Section 4 4 (a) took
effect, yet no mention of the amendment is made in the decision.
23 Schwartz v. Mills, 192 F. 2d 727, 731 (2d Cir. 1951).
24 167 F. 2d 318 (2d Cir. 1948) ; 27 Tmx. L. Ray. 383 (1949).2 5 In re Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 86 F. 2d 474 (7th Cir. 1936);
'In re Charles Nelson Co., 27 F. Supp. 673 (N. D. Cal. 1939) ; The Gloucester,
285 Fed. 579 (D. Mass. 1923) ; accord, In re Hale Desk Co., 89 F. 2d 1 (2d
Cir. 1937). See In re Fox West Coast Theatres, 88 F. 2d 212, 227-230 (9th
Cir. 1937). See Wang, The Corporate Entity Concept (or Fiction Theory)
and the Modern Business Organization, 28 MiNN. L. Ryv. 341 (1944) for an
excellent treatment of the entire subject and reported cases.
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True, courts have pierced the "corporate veil" when fraud or
injustice would otherwise result.26  Principals incorporated to evade
the force of legislative enactment will not be permitted to benefit by
the protection of corporate insulation.27  Application of the "instru-
mentality rule" has equivalent effect: where a corporation is merely
used as an instrument or agent of another in a single enterprise,
corporate form will not prevent recognition of the true principals.28
The creditor in the instant case is not measured by any of these
specifications. Neither fraud nor injury to the general creditors is
alleged, and there is no evidence of an attempt to evade the statute.
The instrumentality theory is not applicable for the creditor and
bankrupt were involved in completely separate enterprises despite
their common ownership.29
There is little indication that courts will relax the rigidity of
the corporate entity theory under exceptions differing from those
already mentioned.30 The dictum of Judge Frank in the Loewer's
case 31 is an extreme view; it is not likely to be followed in the fore-
28 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939) ; Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec-
tric Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1938); see U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit
Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (E. D. Wis. 1905), "A corporation will be looked upon
as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary
appears; but when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public con-
venience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard
the corporation as an association of persons."
27 Nettles v. Rhett, 94 F. 2d 42 (4th Cir. 1938) ; see Jenkins v. Moyse, 254
N. Y. 319, 323, 324, 172 N. E. 521, 522 (1930). But cf. Schenley Distillers
Corp. v. United States, 326 U. S. 432 (1946).
28 Hollander v. Henry, 186 F. 2d 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 949
(1951); In. re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609 (S. D. Ohio 1907).
But cf. Moline Properties v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 319 U. S. 436
(1942) ; Consumers Const. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 94 F.
2d 731 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 577 (1938). Compare In re Otsego
Waxed Paper Co., 14 F. Supp. 15 (W. D. Mich. 1935), with Madden v. Mac
Sim Bar Paper Co., 103 F. 2d 974 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 556
(1939).
29 Transcript of Record, In the Matter of Grade A Foods Corp. (S. D.
N. Y. 1951).
30 See note 25 supra. Courts have refused to disregard the corporate entity
in any event unless fraud or injustice would otherwise be abetted. To this
effect, see United States v. White Sulphur Springs, 57 F. Supp. 48 (S. D.
W. Va. 1944); In re Oceanic Insul-Lite Corp. v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair
Corp., 191 Misc. 354, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; see Kentucky Elec-
tric Power Co. v. Norton Coal Mining Co., 93 F. 2d 923, 926 (6th Cir.
1938) (entity stands unless unfair advantage taken of subsidiary by parent
corporation).
3- See In re Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F. 2d 318, 319 (2d Cir.
1948). Hand, J., concurred, applying the "instrumentality rule" (see note 28
supra). The other judge merely concurred in the result, without expressing an
opinion on the law. The lower court opinion, In re Loewer's Gambrinus
Brewery Co., 74 F. Supp. 909 (S. D. N. Y. 1947), noted that both creditor
and bankrupt corporations were merely agencies for the conduct of a single
enterprise for the benefit and under the control of their common owners. On
the other hand, the Record on Appeal in the Schwartz case discloses that both
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seeable future, barring legislative activity. Therefore, it would seem
that the instant case pronounces a technically correct statement of
the applicable law. Although the dissent is in closer harmony with
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act, its acceptance as the governing rule
would necessitate a change in the existing statute 3 2 or in the sub-
stantive law of corporations.
CONTRACTS - JOINT VENTURES - ENFORCING LEGAL PART OF
AGREMENT.-Plaintiff, formerly sole proprietor of a New York
liquor business, entered upon a joint venture with defendants to sell
alcohol for industrial use and for beverage purposes in New York
and in international trade. Renewals of plaintiff's liquor license were
thereafter granted upon admittedly false statements that he was sole
owner of the business. In an action brought for an accounting, de-
fendants' motion to dismiss the complaint was granted because of the
resulting illegality 1 to that part of the business which encompassed
the selling of alcohol in New York. Held, reversed. Dismissal of
corporations involved were engaged in separate businesses and the claims at-
tempted to be voted did not arise out of a course of dealings between them
as in the Loewer's case.
32 Compare Section 44(a), supra note 17, with the standards of impartiality
set out elsewhere in the Act for a trustee in corporate reorganization. BANK-
Rurrc, Acr § 158(4), 52 STAT. 888 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 558(4) (1946), de-
clares that a person shall not be deemed disinterested for the purposes of
selection as a trustee in corporate reorganization if ". . . it appears that he
has, by reason of any other direct or indirect relationship to, connection with,
or interest in the debtor or such underwriter, or for any reason an interest
materially adverse to the interests of any class of creditors or stockholders."
(Emphasis supplied.) See also Consolidated Realty Co. v. Dyers, Finishers &
Bleachers Federation, 137 N. J. Eq. 413, 45 A. 2d 132 (Ch. 1946). The court
ruled that a corporation, owned and controlled by the same persons as another
corporation then involved in a labor dispute, was deemed to be an interested
party in said labor dispute despite the separate entities of both corporations.
The statute applicable (R. S. 2: 29-77.8 N. J. S. A.) read, "A person or asso-
ciation shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute
... if he or it is engaged in the industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which
such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein. . .
I N. Y. ALco. Bay. Co. LAw § 110. . .. [I]n any application for a license
under this chapter, the following information shall be given under oath:
1. The name . . . of each applicant and, if there be more than one and
they be partners, the partnership name ... of the several persons so applying.
2. The name.., of each person interested, or to become interested, in the
business covered by license for which application is made, together with the
nature of such interests. . . . N. Y. ALco. BEy. Co. LAW § 130. "Any person
who shall make any false statement in the application for a license or permit
under this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor..
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